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Abstract 
We test whether induced mood states have an effect on elicited risk and time preferences in a 
conventional laboratory experiment. We jointly estimate risk and time preferences and use a 
mixture specification that allows choices to be consistent with Expected Utility theory or with 
probability weighting. Time preferences between subjects in the control, positive mood, and 
negative mood treatments are not statistically significantly different. However, for choices 
consistent with Expected Utility Theory, we find that subjects induced into a negative mood 
exhibit higher risk aversion than those in either the control treatment or the positive mood 
treatment.  For choices that are consistent with probability weighting, we find that positive mood 
increases risk aversion. Results also suggest that risk preferences are affected by whether a 
cognitively demanding task precedes a risk preference elicitation task or whether subjects were 
placed in a gender-specific session rather than a mixed-gender session. 
Keywords: discount rates, risk aversion, lab experiment, mood, affect 
JEL codes: D81, C91, D00 
 
1. Introduction  
 In the beginning of the 20th century, economics was generally devoid of psychological 
concepts by basing economic theory on the principles of rational choice (see Bruni and Sugden 
2007 for a historical perspective). However, with the advent of “behavioral economics”, there 
                                                 
1 We would like to thank Spyros Stachtiaris and Achilleas Vassilopoulos for excellent research assistance. Glenn 
Harrison provided valuable help in resolving the numerous issues with the estimations and was extremely patient in 
responding to our queries. We are solely responsible of any errors. 
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has been considerable effort lately in bringing out psychological concepts in economics. Hence, 
economics and psychology no longer stand in complete isolation. Reviews of the fruitfulness of 
this interaction have appeared in core economic journals. For example, Elster (1998) brought out 
the interesting features of “emotions” in the development of economic theory and in explaining 
human behavior. The seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the collective volume 
edited by Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin (2004) have been extremely influential in this 
respect as well. 
The literature in economics usually confounds emotions and mood in an almost 
indistinguishable way. However, there are stark differences between emotions and moods, as 
described in the psychology literature. Emotions tend to be extremely brief, lasting for a few 
seconds (Izard 1991; Larsen 2000) while moods typically last longer (Watson and Vaidya 2003). 
To quote the example provided in Watson and Vaidya (2003), the full emotion of anger might 
last for only a few seconds while an annoyed or irritable mood may persist for several hours or 
even for a few days. In essence, the concept of mood subsumes all subjective feeling states, not 
simply those experiences that accompany classical, prototypical emotions such as fear and anger 
(Watson and Vaidya 2003). Therefore, it appears that in order to explore all aspects of affective 
states on human behavior, it would be necessary to go beyond examining the narrow boundaries 
of emotions and delve into studying the much broader concept of mood. 
In this study, we examine the role of mood in joint elicitation of risk and time 
preferences. Studies in the literature that examine the role of mood on risk and time preferences 
have focused only on either risk or time preferences but not both at the same time. The 
examination of both risk and time preferences is important since they are fundamental economic 
preferences that have been found to influence many facets of economic decision-making and 
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human behavior. For example, risk and time preferences have been shown to influence self-
control problems that could lead to negative health outcomes (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine 2009; 
Benhabib and Bisin 2005; Bernheim and Rangel 2004). 
The hypothesis that people tend to make judgments that are mood congruent, dates back 
to Johnson and Tversky (1983). Johnson and Tversky (1983) found that bad mood increased 
subjective probabilities of risk assessments while positive mood produced a comparable decrease 
in subjective probabilities. This hypothesis of mood congruent judgments implies that moods 
may affect preference formation by influencing judgments.  
In psychology, two models of decision making which relate mood states with risk-taking, 
predict the exact opposite things. One of these models is the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) which 
suggests that positive mood increases risk-taking behavior while negative mood reduces the 
tendency to take risks (Forgas 1995). This is because individuals in an elated mood rely on 
positive cues in making judgments and thus are more likely to think about the positive aspects of 
risky situations than those in a negative mood. The other model is the Mood Maintenance 
Hypothesis (MMH) which asserts that people in elated moods may not want to risk losing the 
elated state and thus render themselves more risk averse (Isen and Patrick 1983). Hence, 
according to this model, people in negative moods will be willing to take more risk (be less risk 
averse) in order to obtain greater potential gains and consequently a better mood. Many studies 
in the literature have since then taken one side or the other. For example, Isen and Patrick (1983) 
found that subjects under positive affect were betting less on gambles. Those in positive mood 
have also been found to require a higher probability of winning when taking bets (Isen and Geva 
1987).  
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Much of the literature on mood and risk aversion appeared only over the last decade.  
Most of these studies can be found not in the economics but in the psychology literature2. For 
example, Hockey et al. (2000) examined the effect of naturally occurring and induced negative 
moods (in particular anxiety, depression and fatigue) on risk in every day (hypothetical) decision 
making and found that fatigue was more strongly linked to increased riskiness. In another study, 
Hills et al. (2001) examined the effect of mood states in persistence (duration) in playing 
gambling games and found that negative moods had an inhibitory effect (which can be 
interpreted as less risk taking) but only for non-regular gamblers. Regular gamblers were 
completely unaffected. Similarly, Yuen and Lee (2003) found that people in induced depressed 
mood had lower willingness to take risk (where risk was defined based on hypothetical choices 
from everyday life dilemmas) than people in neutral and in positive mood while Williams et al. 
(2003) found that decision makers (managers) with high negative affect were more likely to 
avoid risk (as measured by hypothetical choices of actions to varied business scenarios). In a 
related study, Chou et al. (2007) reconfirmed that individuals in a negative mood are less willing 
to take up more risk (where risk was defined similar to Yuen and Lee 2003).  However, they 
found an asymmetric age effect, where positive mood affects risk taking only for older 
individuals. More recently, Kugler, Connolly, and Ordóñez (2010) found that the impact of 
prototypical emotions such as fear and anger is contingent on the type of the risk. They found 
that fearful participants were more risk-averse than angry participants in lottery-risk tasks. The 
fearful participants, however, were less risk-averse than the angry participants in tasks where risk 
was generated by another person’s uncertain behavior. 
Kim and Kanfer (2009) offered a bridge that addresses the inconsistencies between AIM 
and MMH by evaluating what they called “an integrative explanation”. Specifically, they  
                                                 
2 We only focus on the literature on mood and risk/time preferences for brevity and due to journal page restrictions. 
 
5 
 
showed that if a cognitive demanding task intervenes between negative mood induction and risk-
taking judgments (defined as choices over dilemmas) the observed trend reverts; i.e., subjects 
exhibited lower levels of risk-taking judgments (offering support for AIM) as opposed to higher 
levels of risk-taking when there is no intervening cognitive task (offering support for MMH). 
Grable and Roszkowski (2008) found that incidental positive mood was positively 
associated with having a higher level of financial risk tolerance (as measured on a financial risk 
tolerance scale). In a laboratory experiment, Fehr-Duda et al. (2011) showed that incidental (not 
induced) good mood has a significant effect on the shape of the probability weighting function 
for women (but not men); that is, women weighed probabilities of gains and losses relatively 
more optimistically than men. In contrast, Walser and Eckel (2010) found no effect of mood on 
risk preferences. 
 As discussed above, although there have been a few studies in the economics literature 
that examined the relation between mood and risk preferences, there have been only two studies 
that explored the link between mood and time preferences. Specifically, McLeish and Oxoby 
(2007) found evidence that inducing subjects with negative mood results in greater impatience 
(i.e., increased discount rates) but only among women.  Ifcher and Zarghamee (2010) found that 
mild positive affect significantly reduces time preference. In the marketing literature, Pyone and 
Isen (2011) found that subjects in a positive mood were more forward looking. 
In this study, we revisit the issue of determining the effect of mood states on preferences 
but in contrast to previous studies, we elicit measures of risk and time preferences using a 
conventional lab experiment (according to the terminology of Harrison and List 2004) and 
jointly estimate the parameters of interest in a structural econometric model. This is an important 
topic that has not been examined in the literature since joint (as opposed to separate) estimation 
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of risk and time preferences could potentially provide a different set of results on mood effects 
than what has been found in previous studies that did not jointly elicit or estimate these 
preferences. For example, Andersen et al. (2008) have shown that joint estimation of risk and 
time preferences, as opposed to separate estimation, results in significantly different discount 
rates. They then conclude that credible estimation of discount rates rely on the joint estimation of 
risk and time preferences.    
In addition, we also utilize the statistical specification and theoretical framework of 
Andersen et al. (2008).  Unlike much of the previously cited literature (with the exception of 
McLeish and Oxoby 2007; Ifcher and Zarghamee 2010; Walser and Eckel 2010; Hills et al. 
2001; Fehr-Duda et al. 2011), we use non-hypothetical elicitation procedures and use real 
monetary incentives for recruitment and elicitation of risk and time preferences. We also explore 
if a cognitively demanding task right after mood inducement could affect risk preferences and 
whether there are gender differences in elicited risk and time preferences. 
To further assess the contribution of our study in the literature and be able to compare our 
findings with other studies, we developed a table (see Table A1 in the Appendix) that 
summarizes the relevant literature that relates mood states with risk or time preferences. From 
the 15 studies we identified, only five of them used real financial commitments to elicit risk or 
time preferences and none conducted joint elicitation/estimation of risk and time preferences. Of 
these five studies that used real financial commitments, one study examined incidental moods 
instead of induced mood (Fehr-Duda et al. 2011) while only a single study (Walser and Eckel 
2010) used validated scales from psychology to measure the success of the induction procedure 
(i.e., mood measurement). Our study uses similar procedures used in four out of these five 
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studies (McLeish and Oxoby 2007; Ifcher and Zarghamee 2010; Walser and Eckel 2010; Fehr-
Duda et al. 2011). Our sample size is also comparable to most of the above cited studies.   
In terms of the results, one of the studies found no effect of mood (Walser and Eckel 
2010) on risk, two of the studies found mood effects on time preferences (McLeish and Oxoby 
2007) and risk preferences (Fehr-Duda et al. 2011) but only for women, one study found a 
significant mood effect on risk preferences but only for a sub-sample (i.e, non-gamblers) (Hills et 
al. 2001), and one study found significant effects on time preferences that hold across all subject 
groups (Ifcher and Zarghamee 2010). In contrast to Walser and Eckel (2010) that did not find an 
effect of mood on risk, we find that both positive and negative moods increase risk aversion but 
this depends on whether choices are explained by either Expected Utility theory (EUT) or 
probability weighting. In contrast to Ifcher and Zarghamee (2010), we find no effect of mood on 
elicited discount rates. 
In addition to the joint elicitation and estimation of risk and time preferences, we also 
extend our design in two directions. First, we inserted a cognitively demanding task (preference 
reversals phase) in half of the sessions, following Kim and Kanfer (2009). In contrast to their 
study, our results suggest that subjects become more risk averse under negative mood when no 
intervention stage is used. We find support for the AIM when no intervention stage is used for 
choices consistent with EUT and support for the MMH when an intervention stage is used for 
choices consistent with probability weighting. Hence, the important factors that seem to 
influence results are the cognitively demanding task and the assumption related to probability 
weighting. We note that Kim and Kanfer’s (2009)study did not use real monetary incentives. 
Secondly, due to the widespread evidence of gender differences on choice under risk 
(e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund 2007; Gneezy, Leonard, and List 2009; Booth and Nolen 2009b, 
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2009a), we examine gender differences on choice under risk by employing gender-specific 
sessions and contrasting these with mixed gender sessions. Interestingly, we find evidence that a 
same-gender environment can alter elicited risk preferences (but not discount rates) even though 
subjects are aware that the outcome of their decisions does not depend on decisions made by 
others. 
In the next sections we describe in detail our experimental procedures, present the 
framework for the analysis and then the results and discussion. 
 
2. Experimental procedures 
The experiment we designed was part of a larger project on choice under risk that also 
involved a lottery choice task and a lottery auction task aimed at identifying preference reversals. 
In this paper, we used a preference reversal task as a cognitive intervening stage before risk 
elicitation to check if this intervening stage would make a difference in the measurement of risk 
preferences under different mood states, as has been proposed in the literature (Kim and Kanfer 
2009). Following Andersen et al. (2008), the time preference task was placed at the very end of 
each session since it involved winning a considerable amount of money and we did not want to 
risk contaminating the previous tasks with income effects. Andersen et al. (2010) found in one of 
their treatments that there are no statistically or economically significant order effects in the risk 
and time preference tasks. Order effects are more likely to appear in situations where a similar 
task is repeated twice (or more) as in Harrison et al. (2005). Since our risk and preference 
reversal tasks both involve lotteries and might be considered similar, we presented them to 
subjects in alternating order between sessions.  
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As discussed earlier, due to the widespread evidence of gender differences on choice 
under risk (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund 2007; Gneezy, Leonard, and List 2009; Booth and 
Nolen 2009b, 2009a), we also tested whether risk and time preferences might be affected when 
we alter the environment of the session in terms of gender. Therefore, we conducted additional 
sessions with males only and females only. 
To minimize the number of sessions that we would need to run the full design, we 
decided to induce different mood states to subjects in the same session. Given that our computer 
lab is equipped with private booths and no communication between subjects was aloud, we were 
certain that no mood contagion took place. Our mood inducement technique is described in detail 
below. 
Our full design involved six treatments in six sessions3. In the first two treatments we 
induced half of the subjects with positive mood and half of the subjects with negative mood. The 
only difference between the first two treatments was that the order of the preference reversals 
and risk preferences task were alternated. In treatments 3 and 4 (our control treatments), mood 
was only measured and not induced. The order of the preference reversals and the risk 
preferences task was also alternated in these treatments. Treatments 5 and 6 were similar to 
treatment 1 except that subjects in these treatments were all females and males, respectively. 
Table I shows the experimental design. We only used one proctor or monitor (i.e., one of the 
authors) for all sessions. To isolate the role of mood and order of the tasks on risk and time 
                                                 
3 In our very first session a couple of things went wrong which prompted us to rerun this session with a completely 
different set of subjects. First, one of the subjects could not keep himself quiet during the experiment although we 
pointed out the necessity of no communication. Improper behavior resulted in early termination of his participation 
in the session. In addition, a server failure resulted in having subjects wait for more than 10 minutes doing nothing. 
Since the necessary control was lost and given the sensitivity of our design to contaminating mood behavior, we 
decided to dismiss all data from this session. Therefore, in total we ran seven sessions, the seventh being a re-run of 
treatment one. We dismissed data from session 1 from all further analysis. 
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preferences we first analyzed treatments 1 to 4 together and then analyzed treatments 1, 5, and 6 
together to explore gender differences in our data.  
 
2.1. Description of the experiment 
The conventional lab experiment was conducted using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher 
2007).4 Subjects consisted of undergraduate students at the Agricultural University of Athens. 
During the recruitment, the nature of the experiment and the expected earnings were not 
mentioned. However, subjects were told that they will be given the chance to make more money 
during the experiment. Stochastic fees have been shown to be able to generate samples that are 
less risk averse than would otherwise have been observed (Harrison, Lau, and Rutström 2009). 
Each subject participated in only one of the treatments exhibited in Table I. The size of 
the groups varied from 15 to 18 subjects per treatment. Each treatment lasted a little more than 
an hour. In total, 101 subjects participated in our experiments, which were conducted in March 
2010. This number does not include 15 subjects from session 1 that were dismissed from any 
further data analysis. We considered these data contaminated as noted in footnote 2. 
Each session consisted of different phases: the mood induction phase, the lottery choice 
phase, the lottery auction phase, the mood measurement phase, the risk preferences phase, the 
time preferences phase and the post-auction phase5. The lottery auction and choice phases are not 
part of the research agenda of this paper and will not be given further consideration. Subjects 
were given prior instructions on the overall layout of the session and were also reminded about 
                                                 
4 z-Tree is a software package designed to facilitate computer-based economic experiments. It has been used in 
numerous experiments as evident by the more than 2300 citations that the paper documenting the software has 
collected in Google scholar.  
5 We also measured the rate of preference reversals using lottery choice tasks and lottery auction tasks but since 
these phases are not part of this paper’s research focus, we are not giving a detailed discussion. Prior to the auction 
phase and mood induction there was also significant training with the auction mechanism which included 
hypothetical as well as real auctions. These phases of the experiment are discussed in Drichoutis et al. (2010). 
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the procedures at the beginning of each phase. Experimental instructions are available at the 
anonymous website https://sites.google.com/site/risktimemood/. 
 
2.2. The mood induction phase 
Mood induction procedures have been widely used by psychologists and have also been 
adopted by economists (e.g., Kirchsteiger, Rigotti, and Rustichini 2006; Capra 2004). Capra et 
al. (2010) give a brief summary of the different methods used in the psychology literature. In this 
study we used experience of success/failure as our mood induction procedure, similar to what 
was used in many other studies (Barone, Miniard, and Romeo 2000; Swinyard 1993, 2003; 
Capra 2004; Capra, Lanier, and Meer 2010; Hill and Ward 1989; Curtis 2006). Specifically, 
subjects in the mood induction treatments were given a MENSA test that had to be completed 
within 6 minutes. Half of the subjects received a 16-question hard MENSA test and half of the 
subjects received an easy MENSA test (the tests are available at 
https://sites.google.com/site/risktimemood/).   
The questions were first pretested in an online survey with a convenience sample using 
snowballing methods. Subjects were randomly exposed to one of the two versions. After taking 
the MENSA test online, we then measured subjects’ moods (see next subsection). In the online 
hard version, the pretest subjects answered on average 4.5 questions correctly while in the online 
easy version, the pretest subjects answered 12.9 questions. Their scores were displayed right 
after the time to complete the test expired, along with a phrase, based on previous research, 
stating that a person between 18-55 years old normally answers about 10 questions correctly, that 
95% of the people answer at least 6 questions correctly and that only 5% answer more than 12 
questions correctly. Subjects in our online survey also got an average of 10 correct questions and 
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have the same age distribution when averaging across both versions of the test. Since the phrase 
was effective in inducing mood (see next paragraph) and generally corresponded with the actual 
distribution of correct answers, we decided to use the same phrase for the lab experiment. 
Given subjects’ scores in the two versions, this feedback immediately placed the average 
subject in the hard version to the low 5% of the population while the average subject in the easy 
version was placed at the top 5%. This way subjects in the hard version experienced failure and 
subjects in the easy version experienced success. In a sample of 49 subjects in the online pretest, 
the two versions of the test were adequate in inducing different levels of positive affect (the null 
of equal scores on the positive affect scale was highly rejected on a t-test with a p-value of 0.02). 
The procedure we discussed above is not new, has been validated, and has been used in 
several other studies (e.g., Swinyard 1993; Barone, Miniard, and Romeo 2000; Swinyard 2003). 
To successfully complete the inducement phase in the lab, we did not tell subjects that they were 
being randomly exposed to different versions of the MENSA test nor that the reference phrase 
given to them corresponded to the average of two versions of an online test. Subjects were only 
told that this phrase corresponds to the average results obtained from another subject pool6. 
Subjects that answered the hard version of the test, scored significantly lower in the positive 
affect scale (discussed in the next paragraph). There was no significant difference between 
subjects with respect to the negative affect scale. 
 
2.3. The mood measurement phase 
                                                 
6 Another method for inducing moods is the use of film clips.  However, an important limitation of the use of films 
is that there are no widely accepted sets of mood eliciting film stimuli, not to mention the challenge of finding film 
stimuli for culturally different or non-English speaking subjects.  
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To find ways to measure mood, we turned to the psychology literature for guidance. 
Watson and Vaidya  (2003) provided a comprehensive overview of the dimensionality of the 
mood construct as well as on ways to measure its dimensions. Mood is usually depicted as a 
circular scheme with four bipolar dimensions that are spaced 45 degrees apart. The positive 
affect and negative affect dimensions are considered the most important measures of the higher 
order dimension.  
The PANAS scale (Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule; which was later subsumed 
into the PANAS-X)  (Watson 1988) emerged as the standard measure of these constructs and has 
been widely used in the literature (Pocheptsova and Novemsky 2010; Bono and Ilies 2006; 
Pelled and Xin 1999; de Ruyter and Bloemer 1998; Pugh 2001). The terms comprising the 
PANAS-X Positive Affect scale are active, alert, attentive, determined, enthusiastic, excited, 
inspired, interested, proud, and strong; the items included in the Negative Affect scale are 
afraid, ashamed, distressed, guilty, hostile, irritable, jittery, nervous, scared, and upset. Subjects 
rated the extent to which they experienced each term right after inducement on a 5-point scale (1 
= very slightly or not at all, 5 = extremely). In the lab the order of appearance of these terms was 
randomized. The scale has been thoroughly tested for reliability and validity (see Watson and 
Vaidya 2003). 
 
2.4. The risk preferences phase  
To elicit risk preferences we used the multiple price list (MPL) design devised by Holt 
and Laury (2002). In this design each subject is presented with a choice between two lotteries, A 
or B as illustrated in Table II. In the first row the subject is asked to make a choice between 
lottery A, which offers a 10% chance of receiving €2 and a 90% chance of receiving €1.6, and 
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lottery B, which offers a 10% chance of receiving €3.85 and a 90% chance of receiving €0.1. 
The expected value of lottery A is €1.64 while for lottery B it is €0.475, which results in a 
difference of €1.17 between the expected values of the lotteries. Proceeding down the table to the 
last row, the expected values of the lotteries increase but increases much faster for lottery B. 
For each row, a subject chooses A or B and one row is then randomly selected as binding 
for the payout.7 The last row is a simple test of whether subjects understood the instructions 
correctly. A risk neutral subject should switch from lottery A to lottery B at the 5th row. In our 
experiments subjects undertook three risk aversion tasks: they made choices from Table II (the 
1x table), a table where payoffs were scaled up by 10 (the 10x table) and a table similar to Table 
II but without the last three rows (the 1x-framed table). The order of appearance of the tables for 
each subject was completely randomized to avoid order effects (Harrison et al. 2005). The 10x 
table served as an elicitation vehicle of risk when larger payoffs are involved while the 1x-
framed table was used as an alternate format since subjects could be drawn in the middle of the 
ordered table irrespective of their true value (Andersen et al. 2007). One of these tables was 
chosen at the end as binding for the payout. Thus, to infer risk preferences, subjects were asked 
to provide 27 binary choices from the risk preference task.  
 
2.5. The time preferences phase  
The experimental design for measuring discount rates is based on the experiments of 
Coller and Williams (1999), Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002) and Andersen et al. (2008). 
Subjects are confronted with payoff  tables similar to Table III and made choices from three 
tables with different time horizons: the 3-month time horizon table (Table III), the 6-month time 
                                                 
7 In every step that involved random drawings by the computer, we reassured subjects that the drawing was fair and 
that extra care was taken by the programmer to make sure that this is the case. 
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horizon table (payment option B pays in 7 months) and the 12-month time horizon table 
(payment option B pays in 13 months). At the end of the experiment only one table and one row 
were randomly drawn as binding. Financial constraints precluded us from paying every single 
subject in each session and hence only one subject was randomly drawn as the winner. 
In Table III, option A offers 300 € in 1 month and option B offers 300 € +x € in 4 
months, where x ranged from annual interests rates of 5% to 50% on the principal of 300 €, 
compounded semi-annualy to be consistent with national banking practices on savings accounts. 
The table also includes the anual and annual effective interest rates to facilitate comparisons 
between lab and field investments (Andersen et al. 2008). The tasks provided two future income 
options instead of one instant and one future option. This front-end delay on the early payment 
has two advantages: it holds the transaction costs of future options constant (see Coller and 
Williams 1999 for a discussion) and it avoids the passion for the present that decision makers 
exhibit when offered monetary amounts today or in the future. Future payments were guaranteed 
by means of a postdated check with a national bank serving as the third party guarantee. Thus 
subjects provided 30 binary choices for the time preference task that are used to infer time 
preferences. 
 
2.6. The post-experiment phase 
Subjects provided information about their age, household size and income. Experimental 
instructions are available at https://sites.google.com/site/risktimemood/. 
 
3. Identification of risk and time preferences 
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 The identification of risk and time preferences follows closely the framework of Andersen et 
al. (2008), so we will only repeat the basic information here. Andersen et al. (2008) discussed in 
detail how to put parametric structure on the identification of risk and time preferences, the 
theoretical issues involved, and the statistical specification. 
 Let the utility function be the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) specification8: 
  1
1
rMU M
r

           (0) 
for r≠1, where r is the CRRA coefficient. In (0), r=0 denotes risk neutral behavior, r>0 denotes 
risk aversion behavior and r<0 denotes risk loving behavior. 
 In addition, if we assume that Expected Utility Theory (EUT) holds for the choices over 
risky alternatives and that discounting is exponential then the subject is indifferent between two 
income options tM  and tM  if and only if: 
     
1
1t t
U M U M           (0) 
where  tU M  is the utility of monetary outcome tM  for delivery at time t ,   is the discount 
rate,   is the horizon for delivery of the later monetary outcome at time t  , and the utility 
                                                 
8 One may argue that the risk aversion tasks are done over a different prize domain than the discount rate tasks. This 
would cause no problem for the assumption of the CRRA function, given that risk aversion is then constant. It would 
pose a problem however, if other forms are assumed. To allow for the possibility that the relative risk aversion is not 
constant we also tried a more flexible functional form by adapting the hybrid expo-power function of Saha (1993). 
The expo-power function can be defined as     11 exp ru M aM a   , where M is income and a  and r  are 
parameters to be estimated. Relative risk aversion (RRA) is then   11 rr a r M   . 
Given that the model did not converge for the joint estimation of risk and time preferences, we then estimated the 
model for risk aversion only. We allowed parameter a  to be a separate linear function of the control variables that 
are used in latter estimations. The estimates indicate that there is no statistically significant deviation 
in a  from zero for any of the variables controlled for, or for the constant. We can therefore conclude that there is no 
evidence to reject CRRA as a general characterization for this specific sample and this income domain. Similar 
conclusions were drawn in Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom (2007). 
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function is separable and stationary over time.   is the discount rate that equalizes the present 
value of the two monetary outcomes in the indifference condition (0). 
The binary choices of the subjects in the risk preference tasks can be explained by 
different CRRA coefficients. For example, a subject that made four safe choices (i.e., choosing 
option A) and then switched to option B would have revealed a CRRA interval of -0.15 to 0.4. 
The intervals are reported in Table II. Similarly, the binary choices in the time preference tasks 
can be explained by different discount rates. A subject that chose 300 € in 1 month would have 
revealed a discount rate higher than  / 300 100%x  ; otherwise she would have revealed an annual 
discount rate of  / 300 100%x   or less9. 
Andersen et al. (2008) explicitly write the likelihood function for the choices that subjects 
make in these tasks and jointly estimate the risk parameter r and the discount rate  . The 
contribution to the overall likelihood from the risk aversion responses can be written for each 
lottery i as: 
    
1,2
i j j
j
EU p M U M

   (0) 
where  jp M  are the probabilities for each outcome jM  that are induced by the experimenter 
(i.e., columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 in Table II). To specify the likelihoods conditional on the model, a 
stochastic specification from Holt and Laury (2002) is used. The expected utility (EU) for each 
lottery pair is calculated for candidate estimate of r and the ratio: 
1
1 1
B
A B
EUEU
EU EU

     (0) 
                                                 
9 The fact that the whole experiment was computerized allowed us to impose monotonic preferences (i.e., subjects 
could only switch once to option B and could not go back and forth). We did not allow for indifference between A 
and B choices either. Subjects had to clearly state whether they preferred option A or B. 
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is then calculated where AEU  and BEU  refer to options A and B respectively, and   is a 
structural noise parameter. The index in (0) is linked to observed choices by specifying that the 
option B is chosen when 12EU  . 
The conditional log-likelihood can then be written as: 
        ln , ; , ln | 1 ln 1 | 1RA i i
i
L r y EU y EU y       X  (0) 
where  1 1iy    denotes the choice of the option B (A) lottery in the risk preference task i. 
The conditional log-likelihood for the time preference task can be written in a similar 
manner if we write the discounted utility of each option as: 
1
1
r
A
A
MPV
r

    and    
11
11
r
B
B
MPV
r

     (0) 
and the index of the present values as: 
1
1 1
B
A B
PVPV
PV PV

           (0) 
where   is a noise parameter for the discount rate tasks. The log-likelihood will then be: 
        ln , , ; , ln | 1 ln 1 | 1DR i i
i
L r y PV y PV y        X  (0) 
and the joint likelihood will be: 
     ln , , , ; , ln , ; , ln , , ; ,RA DRL r y L r y L r y      X X X    (0) 
Each parameter in equation (0) can be allowed to be a linear function of treatment effects. 
Equation (0) can be maximised using standard numerical methods. We used the routines made 
available as a supplemental material in Andersen et al. (2008) with appropriate modifications. 
For a more thorough and pedagogical treatise on maximum likelihood estimation of utility 
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functions, see Appendix F in Harrison and Rutstrom (2008) or Harrison (2008). The statistical 
specification also takes into account the multiple responses given by the same subject and allows 
for correlation between responses.  
 
 
4. Estimation and results 
Each subject in our experiment responded to 57 binary tasks (27 for the risk preference 
tasks and 30 for the time preference tasks). Data from subjects who chose lottery A over the last 
row of Table II were dismissed since this is a sign that they failed to comprehend the task. 
Therefore, 15 subjects were further dropped which resulted in a sample size of 86 subjects, with 
2322 risk aversion choices and 2580 discount rate choices.  As mentioned previously, since this 
paper has a twofold goal, we first analyze treatments 1 to 4 together and then examine treatments 
1, 5 and 6. 
 
4.1. Was the mood induction successful? 
 Figure I displays the kernel density estimates of the affect scores for positive and negative 
affect, respectively. The vertical lines depict mean estimates of the scores per treatment.  
Remember that a hard MENSA test aims to induce a negative mood to subjects and an easy 
MENSA test aims to induce a positive mood state through experience of failure and success, 
respectively. We are certain that our subjects experienced success or failure given that those 
exposed to the easy MENSA test in the lab answered on average 12.9 questions correctly (out of 
16) while those exposed to the hard MENSA test answered only about 6 questions correctly.  
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 It is obvious from panel A that the density function of positive affect for those exposed to 
the hard MENSA test is slightly shifted to the left implying lower scores for those exposed to the 
hard test. The density function of those exposed to the easy test has a slightly larger peak but is 
otherwise very close to the density function of the control group. One could tell a similar story 
based on the means (vertical lines) of the positive affect scores across treatments. 
 Panel B shows that both densities associated with the negative affect scores of those exposed 
to the easy and hard test are shifted right with respect to the control group. The density function 
of those exposed to the hard test is slightly more to the right but is practically indistinguishable 
from the density function of those exposed to an easy test. Comparing the means just reconfirms 
the above. 
These results also hold up in a regression context. We run separate regressions for the 
positive affect and negative affect scales which are depicted in Table IV. The list of covariates 
includes dummies for those exposed to the easy and hard MENSA tests (the control treatments, 
where mood was not induced, serve as the base category). We used demographic variables as 
additional control variables. Variable description is exhibited in Table V. 
 Results are in agreement with Figure I. Subjects that were exposed to a hard test scored 
significantly lower (by almost 4 points) in the positive affect scale compared to subjects in a 
control group and those who took the easy test. No statistically significant differences are 
observed between those answering an easy test and those in the control group and the magnitude 
of the difference in the scores is negligible. Hence, our mood induction procedure was able to 
induce lower levels of positive affect to those that took the hard test. 
 On the other hand, both the easy and hard tests induced higher negative affect with respect 
to the control group by as much as 5 points, which is also evident in Figure I where both density 
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functions are shifted to the right. The Hard coefficient is larger than the Easy coefficient by one 
point (i.e., those exposed to a hard test had on average higher levels of negative affect) although 
their difference is not statistically significant. So why did both procedures induce higher negative 
affect? One explanation could be that the quiz-type procedure resembles exams that associate 
negatively with students’ mood (e.g., test anxiety). It is also important to remember that positive 
affect and negative affect are two dimensions of mood that can co-exist. The overall conclusion 
is that subjects that took the hard test had lower positive affect than subjects that took the easy 
test and there was no statistically significant difference in their negative affect level. They also 
exhibited less positive affect and higher negative affect than the control group.  
 
4.2. Risk aversion and discount rates under induced mood states 
We first analyze data from treatments 1 to 4 to examine whether mood states can affect 
risk and time preference elicitation. Also, since we alternated the order of the preference reversal 
task and the risk preference task after mood inducement, we are able to test the AIM vs. MMH 
issue; that is, examine the effect of an intervening cognitive demanding task before risk 
elicitation. Kim and Kanfer (2009) found that this procedure makes a significant difference when 
evaluating risk-taking judgments. 
Table VI exhibits the maximum likelihood estimates of risk and time preferences. We 
allowed the   and r  parameters of equation (0) to be linear functions of treatment effects. We 
model r  as a linear function of the treatment variables (Positive mood, Negative mood, Task 
order) as well as their interactions (Positive x Order, Negative x Order) in order to capture the 
differential effect of the order of the tasks and mood induction as predicted by AIM and MMH. 
The   parameter is modeled as a linear function of the treatment variables alone (no interaction 
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effects). One could in principle allow several variables to enter the linear specification of   and 
r  but this comes at the cost of convergence, at least with our data. Given our random 
assignment to treatments we can safely assume that our effects are causal. There are also no 
significant differences in the socio-demographic profile of our subjects between the treatments. 
We used chi-square and Fischer’s exact tests to check the variables depicted in Table V (t-tests 
were used for the continuous variables like age and household size). None of the differences was 
statistically significant. 
Panel A presents maximum likelihood estimates allowing for risk aversion (joint 
estimation of risk and time preferences) and assuming an exponential discounting specification.  
Results in panel A show three things. The first is that mood does not significantly affect 
time preferences. While signs of coefficients are in the expected direction i.e., subjects in 
positive mood exhibit higher discount rates while subjects in negative mood exhibit lower 
discount rates, these are not statistically significant given the dispersions.  
Second, with respect to risk preferences positive mood has no statistically significant 
effect on RRA coefficient while negative mood increases risk aversion (by 0.24) but only when 
there is no intervening task between mood induction and risk preference elicitation. When we 
insert an intervening task (i.e., a cognitively demanding task), the effect becomes statistically 
insignificant. This finding supports the AIM model (versus the Mood Maintenance Hypothesis) 
but not the integrative explanation of Kim and Kanfer’s (2009) which predicts that subjects in 
negative mood should be less risk averse when there is no intervening stage between mood 
induction and risk preference elicitation. Our results therefore question the intervening stage 
explanation offered by Kim and Kanfer (2009) which was based on the use of hypothetical 
elicitation of risk preferences. 
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Finally with respect to the order of the tasks, for subjects that we intervened with a 
cognitively demanding task, risk aversion increased when they were induced with positive mood 
or not induced at all (control treatment). The RRA coefficient was not affected when induced 
with negative mood. A t-test indicates that the effect of the order of the tasks was not 
significantly different between positive mood and control treatment. 
  
4.3. Robustness checks 
Basic insights gained over the previous section about the effect of mood on risk and time 
preferences clearly hinge upon certain assumptions about functional forms. In this section we 
examine how robust our results are when we deviate from these assumptions. We first consider 
an alternative discounting function assumed by hyperbolic discounting models10, then introduce 
probability weighting under exponential and hyperbolic discounting models and then consider a 
mixture specification of EUT and probability weighting. 
4.3.1. Hyperbolic discounting 
When considering a hyperbolic discounting function, one would need to replace (0) with: 
1
1
r
A
A
MPV
r

    and    
11
1 1
r
B
B
MPV
k r

      (0) 
for 0k  . Panel B in Table VI shows estimates when considering this alternative discounting 
function. Not only do we get qualitatively similar results as compared to the exponential 
discounting model but many estimates change at the third decimal point. Therefore, it appears 
that the issue of using exponential or hyperbolic discounting specification is not as crucial, at 
least with our data. 
                                                 
10 As discussed in Andersen et al. (2008), the use of the quasi-hyperbolic specification is not possible due to the 
existence of a front end delay in our tasks. 
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4.3.2. Probability weighting 
Up to now we have only assumed Expected Utility for risk. Since the Allais paradoxes 
(Allais 1953) for EUT and the Nobel-prize winning work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), we 
know that EUT often fails and that one must account for probability weighting especially when 
using smaller scale payoffs. The weighting function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
has been extensively used in the literature and assumes weights of the form: 
    11w p p p p            (0) 
 In (0), when 1   it implies that  w p p  and this serves as a formal test of the 
hypothesis of no probability weighting. Table VII exhibits the estimates when we assume 
probability weighting as in (0) and exponential discounting (panel A) or hyperbolic discounting 
(panel B) specification. A Wald test of a composite linear hypothesis about the parameter   
being equal to one, highly rejects the null under both discounting specifications (p-value=0.013). 
Note that results from the exponential and hyperbolic specification are similar. There are two 
notable differences with the results of the previous section that are worth discussing. The first 
one is with respect to the effect of the treatment variables on risk preferences. Results show that 
negative mood increases risk aversion by a large amount (0.625) but only when there is no 
intervention of a cognitively demanding task. This is consistent with predictions from the Affect 
Infusion Model. However, the order of the lottery tasks does not have a statistically significant 
effect for subjects induced with positive mood as was the case in the linear in probabilities model 
but has a negative and significant effect on subjects induced with negative mood.  
The highly statistically significant results of negative mood and order of the tasks on risk 
preferences reflect directly on discount rates. When probability weighting is brought into the 
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picture, a statistically significant effect of negative mood on discount rates emerges. This effect 
is triple in magnitude than when we assumed a functional form for risk that is linear in 
probabilities. Specifically, we find that negative induced mood reduces discount rates by more 
than 13%. In addition, the order of the risk preferences task has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on discount rates. These results with respect to discount rates make sense if we 
consider that increased risk aversion implies more concave utility functions. Therefore, the 
positive effect of negative mood on risk aversion implies lower discount rates while the negative 
effect of order of the tasks on the risk aversion coefficient implies higher discount rates. 
In addition, we find no effect of any of the covariates on the curvature of the probability 
weighting function   . This is surprising given that Fehr-Duda et al. (2011) showed that 
incidental (not induced) good mood has a significant effect on the shape of the probability 
weighting function for women. This is a robust result which is also evident in the next section 
where we explore gender differences. More research on this issue is indeed warranted.  
4.3.3. Mixture models 
In the previous sections we found that inferences change depending on whether we assume a 
weighting probability function for risk or a specification linear in probabilities (but not when we 
assume an exponential or hyperbolic discounting function). The question that arises then is 
which model should we prefer? Up to now we have assumed only one data generating process at 
a time and have estimated each model separately in order to identify the effect of mood on risk 
and time preferences. Harrison and Rutström (2009) allowed more than one process to explain 
observed behavior instead of assuming that the data are generated by a single process. They 
estimated a model where some choices were allowed to be EUT-consistent and other choices to 
be Prospect Theory-consistent and found roughly equal support. A mixture model poses a 
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different question to the data.  As (Harrison 2008) noted, “if two data-generating processes are 
allowed to account for the data, what fraction is attributable to each, and what are the estimated 
parameter values?” 
Let EUT  denote the probability that EUT is correct and 1PW EUT    denote the 
probability that the model that assumes probability weighting is correct. We can replace (0) with: 
    ln , , , , , ; , ln 1 lnEUT PW EUT EUT RA EUT EUT RA PW DRL r r y L L L           X
 
(0) 
where EUTr  is the RRA coefficient from the EUT part and PWr  is the RRA coefficient from the 
part assuming probability weighting.  
 Table VIII provides the maximum likelihood estimates under exponential discounting11. The 
mixing probability EUT  is estimated to be 0.250. Therefore, the complementary probability 
PW  is 0.750. This means that the probability that EUT explains observed choices is 25% while 
the probability that the probability weighting explains observed choices is 75%. Thus it appears 
that there is more support for the probability weighting specification. Note that a Wald test of a 
composite linear hypothesis about the parameter   being equal to one highly rejects the null (p-
value=0.00). 
 With respect to the effect of mood on risk preferences, results boil down to this: negative 
mood has a positive and statistically significant effect on risk preferences as explained by EUT. 
Negative induced mood makes subjects more risk averse but only when a cognitively demanding 
task is not intervened between mood induction and risk preference elicitation. This finding is 
consistent with AIM but not the integrative explanation of Kim and Kanfer’s (2009). In addition, 
positive mood increases risk aversion under probability weighting. This finding is consistent 
                                                 
11 A mixture model assuming hyperbolic discounting did not converge with our data. We would not expect to find 
significant differences though, since we demonstrated in the previous sections that the choice of the discounting 
function has a minimal effect on estimated coefficients. 
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with the Mood-Maintenance Hypothesis. All in all, our results offer support for both AIM and 
MMH but this depends on whether probability weighting is assumed or not. For choices 
explained by classical EUT, AIM explains observed choices better while for choices explained 
by probability weighting, MMH fits the observed choices better. 
With respect to the order of the tasks, having a cognitively demanding task before risk preference 
elicitation increases risk aversion for subjects under induced positive mood and in the control 
treatment but not for subjects under negative mood. In addition, consistent with the previous 
results, the curvature of the probability weighting function is not affected by any of the treatment 
variables. Interestingly, mood has no effect on elicited discount rates when we did not assume a 
mixture specification. It appears that the effect of the treatment variables on time preferences 
was an artifact of the assumption of whether one or more than one data generating process 
affects observed behavior.  Harrison and Rutström (2009) showed that a mixture specification is 
superior than proclaiming than one of the models is correct. 
 While one could also extend the mixture model we estimated above to allow more than one 
data generating process for time preferences (i.e., a mixture of exponential and hyperbolic 
discounting), we encountered convergence problems that made the model inestimable. 
 
4.4. Risk aversion, discount rates and mood: Are there gender differences? 
 To test for gender differences on choice under risk, we ran gender-specific sessions 
represented by Treatments 5 and 6 in Table I. We did not alternate the order of the tasks as done 
in Treatments 1 to 4, since we have tested and demonstrated this effect in the previous section. 
To explore for gender differences, we compared Treatments 1, 5 and 6 and used the data from 
these treatments only. Table IX shows the maximum likelihood estimates from these treatments 
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using a mixture specification of EUT and probability weighting for risk and exponential 
discounting specification for risk preferences12. We allowed the 
EUTr , PWr  and   parameters 
of equation (0) to be linear functions of treatment effects (namely the Positive, FemTreat and 
MaleTreat variables; remember there is no control treatment for these data), gender, and the 
interaction between gender and positive mood inducement dummy. The discount factor   was 
modeled without an interaction term. The mixing probability EUT  is estimated to be 0.205. 
Therefore, the complementary probability PW  is 0.795. Thus it appears that there is 
significantly more support for the probability weighting specification. Note that a Wald test of a 
composite linear hypothesis about the parameter   being equal to one highly rejects the null (p-
value=0.00). 
 The first thing we note from Table IX is that none of the treatment variables has a 
statistically significant effect on risk aversion under EUT while several of the variables affect 
risk aversion under probability weighting. Mood has a gender specific effect on risk aversion. 
While the effect of positive mood on risk aversion is not significantly different than the effect of 
negative mood for males, positive mood significantly reduces risk aversion for females by 0.33. 
In addition, the level of risk aversion does not differ between males and females when induced 
with positive mood but males are significantly less risk averse than females when induced into 
negative mood.  
 Furthermore, peer environment had an effect on risk preference elicitation as well. It appears 
that subjects are more risk averse when they are in mixed gender sessions but this risk aversion 
diminishes when they are in gender specific sessions. In absolute terms, males reduce their risk 
aversion by 0.41 when placed in all male sessions while females reduce their risk aversion by 
                                                 
12 A mixture model of EUT and probability weighting with hyperbolic specification for time preferences would not 
converge with our data. 
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0.33 when placed in all female sessions. A t-test indicates, however, that the reduction in risk 
aversion (as compared to mixed sessions) does not differ significantly between all males sessions 
and all females sessions (p-value=0.683). These differences exist despite the fact that subjects 
made decisions that they knew did not depend on other subjects in the session.  
 The peer environment of risk preference elicitation has a statistically significant effect on the 
curvature of the probability weighting function as well. Males that were placed in all male 
sessions exhibit a 0.83 decrease in the value of   as compared to those in mixed sessions. 
Although we identify several treatment effects on risk preferences, none of these effects carries 
over to the discount rate. We find no mood and gender specific peer-environment effects on time 
preferences.   
 
5. Conclusions 
Our objective in this study is to assess the effect of mood states on risk and time 
preferences. Our paper differs from previous studies in two important ways. First, we 
simultaneously elicited measures of risk and time preferences and jointly estimated the 
parameters of interest using structural econometric methods. Credible estimates of risk and time 
preferences have been found to rely on the joint estimation of risk and time preferences 
(Andersen et al. 2008). Yet, none of the previous studies jointly elicited these preferences when 
examining mood effects. Second, instead of choosing either a EUT or probability weighting 
model, we utilized a more flexible mixture specification that can determine which parts of the 
decisions are consistent with which model. Third, a vast majority of the studies that examined 
the effect of mood states on risk or time preferences was conducted in hypothetical contexts. We 
conducted our risk and time elicitation tasks non-hypothetically. Our results generally suggest 
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that mood states have an effect on risk aversion coefficients. On the other hand, we found ample 
evidence that negative mood reduces discount rates but this effect disappears when we allow for 
mixture specifications. Thus we conclude that although mood has an effect on risk preferences, 
this effect does not carry over to time preferences. This finding is in contrast to the finding of 
Ifcher and Zarghamee (2010) which suggests that mild positive affect significantly increases the 
present value of a future payment. Our finding seemed surprising at first, given the many 
similarities in the experimental procedures followed (e.g., paid for recruitment, real elicitation 
context, student sample etc.) in their study and ours. However, Ifcher and Zarghamee (2010) did 
not consider the simultaneous determination of risk and time preferences and did not use mixture 
specifications. Thus, in contrast to our work, they implicitly assumed risk neutrality in eliciting 
time preferences and did not employ a more flexible model.  
Considering the robust finding in the literature of the general effect of risk and time 
preferences on human behavior and health outcomes (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine 2009; 
Benhabib and Bisin 2005; Bernheim and Rangel 2004), the issue examined in our study has 
significant implications for assessment of the potential mechanisms through which risk and time 
preferences affect behavior and health outcomes. Our study does not support the argument 
offered in Ifcher and Zarghamee (2010) that affect should be neutralized before elicitation of 
time preferences and that uncontrolled affect may be partially responsible for the wide range of 
time preference values estimated in past time preference studies. However, it is possible that 
mood effects could be responsible for the divergence of findings in risk preference elicitation 
studies. This issue is important in economics considering the large literature devoted to 
estimating and analyzing risk preferences. 
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6. Appendix 
Table A1. Literature on mood and risk and time preferences 
Study Paid 
for 
particip
ation? 
Elicitation 
context (real 
vs. 
hypothetical) 
Type of 
sample 
Was 
mood 
induced
? (Yes, 
No) 
How was mood 
induced? 
Type of 
mood 
induced 
(Positive, 
negative, 
neutral) 
Mood 
measurement 
How were risk or 
time preferences 
elicited? 
Did the study find 
significant 
association with 
mood? 
(Johnson 
and 
Tversky 
1983) 
Yes Hypothetical Recruited 
from 
university’s 
newspaper, 
probably 
students 
Yes By having 
subjects read 
stories 
Negative, 
positive 
affect, 
neutral 
9-point scale 
anchored by 
negative-
positive 
Were asked to 
estimate the risk 
(probability) for a list 
of death causes 
Negative (positive) 
mood increased 
(decreased) 
subjective 
probability of death 
causes 
(Isen and 
Patrick 
1983) 
No Study 1: non-
financial 
participation 
course credit 
Study 2: 
Hypothetical 
Students Yes By unexpected 
gift 
Positive 
affect, 
neutral 
NA Study 1: bets on a 
roulette with varying 
chances of winning 
Study 2: Likelihood 
of taking the chance 
(1-10 scale) in 
hypothetical 
dilemmas of varying 
risk level 
Study 1: Positive 
mood decreased bets 
(level of risk) 
Study 2: No effect  
(Isen and 
Geva 1987) 
No non-financial 
participation 
Students Yes By unexpected 
gift 
Positive, 
neutral 
NA Subjects indicated 
minimum probability 
of winning for taking 
Positive mood 
increased minimum 
level of probability 
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course credit the bet on a roulette 
with varying chances 
of winning 
of winning for 
taking the bet 
(Hockey et 
al. 2000) 
No Hypothetical Study 1, 2: 
Students 
 
Study 3: 
Young 
management 
trainees of a 
chemical 
company1 
Study 1, 
2: No 
 
Study 3: 
Yes 
Study 1, 2: 
incidental 
moods (not 
induced) 
 
Study 3: by 
giving a set of 
demanding 
tasks as part of 
the coursework 
Study 3: 
negative 
mood 
(increased 
fatigue) 
Mood diary 
for 3 times a 
day for 14  
days (28 days 
in Study 2, 3 
weeks in 
Study 3). 12 
adjectives 
measured 
anxiety, 
depression and 
fatigue 
Choice between 13 
hypothetical 
dilemmas with one 
safe and one risky 
choice each, score of 
riskiness 
Fatigue more 
strongly correlated 
with higher riskiness 
(Hills et al. 
2001) 
Yes Real Students Yes By showing 10 
minute videos 
Positive, 
negative, 
neutral 
By placing a 
mark on a 10-
cm bipolar 
visual 
analogue scale 
with the words 
sad and happy 
at either end 
Number of trials 
subjects played in a 
computerized 
gambling game 
(subjects could stop at 
their own choice) 
Negative mood 
decreased number of 
trials played in the 
gambling game 
(which can be 
interpreted as less 
risk taking) for non-
regular gamblers 
only. No effect for 
regular gamblers. 
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(Yuen and 
Lee 2003) 
 
NA Hypothetical Students 
 
Yes By showing 22-
26  minute 
videos 
Positive, 
negative, 
neutral 
By a 4-item 11 
point likert 
scale 
(anchored by 
unpleasant–
pleasant, 
tense–relax, 
tiresome–
energetic, 
anxious-calm) 
Choice between 3 
hypothetical 
dilemmas with one 
safe and one risky 
choice each 
Positive (negative) 
mood increased 
(decreased) risk 
taking tendency. 
(Chou, Lee, 
and Ho 
2007) 
Members of 
community 
and youth 
centers 
Negative mood 
decreased risk 
taking tendency. 
Positive mood 
increased risk taking 
for older but not 
younger people. 
(Williams, 
Zainuba, 
and 
Jackson 
2003) 
No Hypothetical Company 
managers 
No NA NA A 14 item 
precursor of 
the PANAS 
scale 
Self-reported 
likelihood of 
choosing each of a 
number of business 
risk scenarios 
Negative affect 
decreased risk 
taking. 
(Fehr-Duda 
et al. 2011) 
Yes Real Students No NA NA On a 6 likert 
scale anchored 
by bad-very 
good 
Choices between 
lotteries and certainty 
payoffs 
Women in positive 
mood (and not men) 
weigh probabilities 
more optimistically. 
(Grable and 
Roszkowsk
i 2008) 
No Hypothetical Non-students No NA NA Self-
evaluation to 
either happy, 
neutral or 
gloomy.  
A 13-item risk-
tolerance scale was 
used 
Positive mood was 
associated with 
higher level of risk 
tolerance. 
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(Walser 
and Eckel 
2010) 
Yes Real Recruited 
from 
university’s 
movie 
theater, 
probably 
students 
Yes By showing  
movies in a 
movie theater 
Whatever 
the movie 
induced 
(subjects 
self-selected 
to attending 
the movie) 
Several: 
PANAS scale, 
10-point likert 
scale anchored 
by bad-good 
mood 
Choices between 
lotteries and certainty 
payoffs 
No significant effect 
(Kim and 
Kanfer 
2009) 
No Hypothetical Students Yes By showing an 
8 minute video 
Negative 20 item 
PANAS scale 
Choice between 10 
hypothetical 
dilemmas in the form 
provided by 
Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) 
Negative mood 
increased risk-taking 
in one task but 
reduced risk-taking 
when a cognitive 
demanding task 
preceded risk 
elicitation. 
(McLeish 
and Oxoby 
2007) 
Yes Real Students Yes Combinining 
feedback 
(success/failure) 
and gifts 
Positive, 
negative, 
neutral 
No Choices between sum 
of moneys in different 
payout periods 
Negative mood 
increases discount 
rate but only for 
women 
(Ifcher and 
Zarghamee 
2010) 
Yes Real Students Yes By showing 
short video 
clips 
Positive, 
neutral 
Subjects were 
asked whether 
the film made 
them happier, 
sad or neither 
Subjects were asked 
to state the amount of 
money they preferred 
today to make them 
indifferent to another 
amount of money in 
Positive affect 
reduces time 
preference 
(increases the 
present value of a 
future payment) 
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the future 
(Pyone and 
Isen 2011) 
No 
(course 
credit) 
Hypothetical Students Yes Study 2: by 
showing picture 
slides 
Study 3, 4: by 
word tasks 
Positive, 
neutral 
Study 2: 7-
point likert 
scales 
anchored by 
positive-
negative, 
pleasant-
unpleasant, 
happy-sad 
Study 3, 4: 
external 
judges scored 
input provided 
by subjects in 
word tasks 
Study 2: Subjects 
filled in a self-
reported future-time 
perspective 
questionnaire 
Study 3, 4: Subjects 
chose between instant 
and future rebates for 
a DVD player 
Study 2: Subjects in 
positive mood 
scored higher in the 
future-time scales 
Study 3, 4: Subjects 
in positive mood 
chose more often the 
future rebate  
1 The trainees participated in two successive five-day professional development courses and in one sense can be considered students. 
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Table I. Experimental design 
Treatments Mood inducement Subject pool Order of Tasks 
1 Yes, Positive-Negative Mixed Preference Reversals – Risk Preferences 
2 Yes, Positive-Negative Mixed Risk Preferences – Preference Reversals 
3 No Mixed Preference Reversals – Risk Preferences 
4 No Mixed Risk Preferences – Preference Reversals 
5 Yes, Positive-Negative Females Preference Reversals – Risk Preferences 
6 Yes, Positive-Negative Males Preference Reversals – Risk Preferences 
 
Table II. Sample payoff matrix in the risk aversion experiments 
Lottery A 
 
Lottery B 
EVA (€) EVB (€) Difference (€) 
Open CRRA 
interval if subject 
switches to 
Lottery B p € p € p € p € 
0.1 2 0.9 1.6  0.1 3.85 0.9 0.1 1.640 0.475 1.17 -∞ -1.71 
0.2 2 0.8 1.6  0.2 3.85 0.8 0.1 1.680 0.850 0.83 -1.71 -0.95 
0.3 2 0.7 1.6  0.3 3.85 0.7 0.1 1.720 1.225 0.50 -0.95 -0.49 
0.4 2 0.6 1.6  0.4 3.85 0.6 0.1 1.760 1.600 0.16 -0.49 -0.15 
0.5 2 0.5 1.6  0.5 3.85 0.5 0.1 1.800 1.975 -0.18 -0.15 0.14 
0.6 2 0.4 1.6  0.6 3.85 0.4 0.1 1.840 2.350 -0.51 0.14 0.41 
0.7 2 0.3 1.6  0.7 3.85 0.3 0.1 1.880 2.725 -0.85 0.41 0.68 
0.8 2 0.2 1.6  0.8 3.85 0.2 0.1 1.920 3.100 -1.18 0.68 0.97 
0.9 2 0.1 1.6  0.9 3.85 0.1 0.1 1.960 3.475 -1.52 0.97 1.37 
1 2 0 1.6  1 3.85 0 0.1 2.000 3.850 -1.85 1.37 +∞ 
Note: Last four columns showing expected values and implied CRRA intervals were not shown 
to subjects. 
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Table III. Payoff table for 3 month horizon in discount rate experiments 
Payoff alternative 
Payment option A 
in € 
(Pays amount 
below in 1 month)
Payment option B 
in € 
(Pays amount 
below in 4 months)
Annual interest 
rate in % 
Annual 
effective 
interest rate in 
% 
1 300 304 5 3.4 
2 300 308 10 6.8 
3 300 311 15 10.1 
4 300 315 20 13.5 
5 300 319 25 16.9 
6 300 323 30 20.3 
7 300 326 35 23.6 
8 300 330 40 27.0 
9 300 334 45 30.4 
10 300 338 50 33.8 
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Table IV. Regression results for positive and negative affect 
Positive affect Negative affect 
Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error
Constant 43.577** 17.847 45.698*** 13.765 
Easy 0.549 1.711 3.917*** 1.319 
Hard -3.776** 1.703 5.013*** 1.313 
Age -0.078 0.944 -1.796** 0.728 
Gender 0.566 1.394 2.277** 1.075 
Hsize -0.187 0.671 -0.325 0.518 
Educ2 -1.287 2.485 0.908 1.916 
Educ3 -3.092 2.756 3.779* 2.126 
Educ4 -2.239 3.858 5.124* 2.976 
Educ5 -1.917 4.926 7.057* 3.799 
Income2 -4.826 2.990 1.320 2.306 
Income3 -5.018 3.187 3.394 2.458 
Income4 -0.334 3.164 0.387 2.440 
R-squared 0.187 0.254 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.076 0.153 
Note: ***, **, * = Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.   
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Table V. Variable description 
Variable Variable description Mean SD 
Age Subject's Age 20.523 1.636
Gender Dummy, 1=male 0.442 0.500
Hsize Household size 4.279 1.059
Educ1* Dummy, 1st year student 0.221 0.417
Educ2 Dummy, 2nd year student 0.128 0.336
Educ3 Dummy, 3rd year student 0.349 0.479
Educ4 Dummy, 4th year student 0.186 0.391
Educ5 Dummy, 5th year student 0.116 0.322
Income1* 
Dummy, Ηousehold's economic position is good, very 
good or above average 0.070 0.256
Income2 Dummy, Ηousehold's economic position is average 0.512 0.503
Income3 Dummy, Ηousehold's economic position is below average 0.221 0.417
Income4 Dummy, Ηousehold's economic position is bad or very bad 0.198 0.401
Positive 
mood 
(Hard) 
Dummy, Subject is induced into positive mood (exposed to 
hard MENSA test) 0.384 0.489
Negative 
mood 
(Easy) 
Dummy, Subject is induced into negative mood (exposed 
to easy MENSA test) 0.349 0.479
Control* Dummy, Subject's mood is not induced 0.267 0.445
Task 
order Dummy, Preference reversal task is conducted first 0.686 0.467
FemTreat Dummy, only females in the session 0.186 0.391
MaleTreat Dummy, only males in the session 0.198 0.401
Mixed* Dummy, mixed gender sessions 0.616 0.489
* Removed for estimation purposes. 
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Table VI. Estimates of risk and time preferences  
CRRA coefficient (r) 
 Individual discount rate (  for 
exponential, k  for hyperbolic) 
Estimate Std. Error  Estimate Std. Error 
A. Exponential discounting 
Positive mood 
 
Task order=1 -0.078 0.061  0.039 0.030 
Task order=0 0.004 0.101  
Negative mood 
 
Task order=1 -0.076 0.098  -0.043 0.038 
Task order=0 0.241** 0.100  
Task order 
Positive mood 0.234** 0.084  
-0.035 0.026 Negative mood -0.001 0.082  
Control 0.315** 0.107  
Constant 0.591** 0.113  0.129** 0.205 
  
0.080** 0.016  
  
 0.028** 0.009 
B. Hyperbolic discounting 
Positive mood 
 
Task order=1 -0.081 0.064 
 
0.041 0.031 Task order=0 0.004 0.101  
Negative mood 
 
Task order=1 -0.080 0.106 
 
-0.043 0.040 Task order=0 0.244** 0.099  
Task order 
Positive mood 0.237** 0.086  
-0.035 0.027 Negative mood -0.003 0.088  
Control 0.321** 0.105  
Constant 0.581** 0.112  0.133** 0.039 
  
0.082** 0.017    
  
 0.029** 0.009 
Note: **, * = Significance at 5%, 10% level. This table presents several conditional marginal effects. For example, 
“Positive mood, Task order=1” refers to the marginal effect of Positive mood conditional on Task order taking the 
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value of 1. In other words, “Positive mood, Task order=1” captures the effect of positive mood in the treatments that 
intervened a cognitively demanding task before risk preference elicitation. Likewise, “Task order, Positive mood” 
refers to the effect of order of the tasks for subjects induced into Positive mood.  
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Table VII. Estimates of risk and time preferences assuming probability weighting 
CRRA coefficient (r) 
 
Curvature of the probability 
weighting function    
 Individual discount rate 
(  for exponential, k  
for hyperbolic) 
Estimate Std. Error  Estimate Std. Error  Estimate Std. Error 
A. Exponential discounting 
Positive 
mood 
 
Task order=1 0.582 0.360 
 
0.714 0.664 
 
0.007 0.074 
Task order=0 0.058 0.094  -0.006 0.092  
Negative 
mood 
 
Task order=1 0.043 0.070 
 
-0.006 0.063 
 
-0.133* 0.072 
Task order=0 0.625** 0.213  0.972 0.998  
Task order 
Positive mood 0.446 0.485  0.603 0.794  
0.173* 0.097 Negative mood -0.660** 0.206  -1.095 0.926  
Control -0.078 0.061  -0.117 0.128  
Constant 0.263** 0.089  0.248 0.231  0.302** 0.074 
  
0.043 0.036       
  
    0.087** 0.021 
B. Hyperbolic discounting 
Positive 
mood 
 
Task order=1 0.574 0.430  0.700 0.777  0.010 0.073 
Task order=0 0.056 0.093  -0.008 0.089  
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Negative 
mood 
 
Task order=1 0.043 0.071  -0.006 0.063  -0.135* 0.076 
Task order=0 0.626** 0.226  0.973 1.020  
Task order 
Positive mood 0.440 0.559  0.592 0.911  
0.178* 0.101 Negative mood -0.661** 0.217  -1.096 0.941  
Control -0.078 0.064  -0.116 0.134  
Constant 0.262** 0.095  0.247 0.245  0.307** 0.080 
  0.043 0.039 
      
    
    0.087** 0.022 
Note: **, * = Significance at 5%, 10% level. This table presents several conditional marginal effects. For example, “Positive mood, 
Task order=1” refers to the marginal effect of Positive mood conditional on Task order taking the value of 1. In other words, “Positive 
mood, Task order=1” captures the effect of positive mood in the treatments that intervened a cognitively demanding task before risk 
preference elicitation. Likewise, “Task order, Positive mood” refers to the effect of order of the tasks for subjects induced into Positive 
mood.  
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Table VIII. Mixture specification of Expected Utility and probability weighting under exponential discounting 
CRRA coefficient  EUTr CRRA coefficient  PWr  Curvature of the probability weighting 
function    Individual discount rate  
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
Positive 
mood 
 
Task order=1 0.095 0.168 0.500** 0.091 0.528 0.335 0.045 0.096 
Task order=0 0.058 0.245 0.064 0.161 -0.034 0.151 
Negative 
mood 
 
Task order=1 -0.125 0.264 0.072 0.084 -0.026 0.069 -0.118 0.075 
Task order=0 0.596** 0.212 -0.072 0.141 -0.162 0.140 
Task 
order 
Positive mood 0.620* 0.357 0.203 0.248 0.351 0.415 
-0.078 0.068 Negative mood -0.139 0.260 -0.089 0.089 -0.074 0.088 
Control 0.583** 0.199 -0.233 0.193 -0.211 0.149 
Constant 0.174 0.114 0.388** 0.162 0.352** 0.163 0.281** 0.061 
  0.250 0.253 0.750** 0.253     
  
0.051** 0.112       
    
    0.055** 0.018 
Note: **, * = Significance at 5%, 10% level. This table presents several conditional marginal effects. For example, “Positive mood, Task order=1” refers to 
the marginal effect of Positive mood conditional on Task order taking the value of 1. In other words, “Positive mood, Task order=1” captures the effect of 
positive mood in the treatments that intervened a cognitively demanding task before risk preference elicitation. Likewise, “Task order, Positive mood” refers 
to the effect of order of the tasks for subjects induced into Positive mood.  
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Table IX. Mixture specification of Expected Utility and probability weighting under exponential discounting (gender differences) 
CRRA coefficient  EUTr CRRA coefficient  PWr  Curvature of the probability weighting 
function    Individual discount rate  
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
Positive mood 
Males 0.102 0.409 -0.075 0.090 -0.120 0.085 
0.026 0.199 Females 0.492 0.453 -0.331** 0.146 -0.134 0.503 
Females only session -0.169 0.565 -0.314* 0.184 -0.092 0.260 -0.061 0.246 
Males only session 0.245 0.542 -0.409** 0.119 -0.831** 0.391 0.138 0.581 
Gender 
Positive 
mood -0.642 0.470 0.014 0.211 0.540 0.532 
-0.172 0.310 
Negative 
mood -0.252 0.586 -0.243** 0.100 0.526 0.406 
Constant 0.386 0.465 0.954** 0.044 0.581 0.451 0.395 0.274 
  0.205 0.227 0.795 0.227     
  
0.045 0.012       
    
    0.093 0.031 
Note: **, * = Significance at 5%, 10% level. This table presents several conditional marginal effects. For example, “Positive mood, Males” refers to the 
marginal effect of Positive mood conditional on Gender being male. In other words, “Positive mood, Males” captures the effect of positive mood for males. 
Likewise, “Gender, Positive mood” refers to the effect of gender for subjects induced into Positive mood.  
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Figure I. Kernel density estimates for affect scores 
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